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During the past 10 years or so, the application of theories and models
borrowed from comparative politics expanded significantly within the study
of the European Union (Pollack, 2005: 368–70). One area of research that has
greatly benefited from this trend is the study of the EU’s delegation of supra-
national powers, which has experienced substantial growth in comparatively
informed literature over the past decade (e.g. Dogan, 1997; Pollack, 1997, 2003;
Tallberg, 2000, 2002; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Hug, 2003).
Among the contributions assessing the patterns of delegation in the EU,
Fabio Franchino’s recently published book The Powers of the Union: Delegation
in the EU deserves further scholarly attention. This book can be seen as the
first systematic formal analysis of delegation to both national and supra-
national agents. Concurrently, the theory of delegation developed by
Franchino is the first to account for the institutional peculiarities of the
European Union. At the same time, Franchino’s book is not an easy read. For
those who are not well-versed in the specifics of principal–agent modelling
or EU legislative–bureaucratic relations, it may be a challenge to understand
Franchino’s theory. In the following, we set out the book’s argument, while
critically assessing its theoretical, methodological and empirical contribution.
Before doing so, we would like to point out that it is a rather daunting 
task to review a book that is such a rich source of theoretical innovation,
methodological originality and analytical skill. Our assessment is thus
intended not as a devaluation of Franchino’s achievements but as an agenda
for future research on EU delegation.
Key argument
The Powers of the Union is the crowning contribution to Franchino’s impress-
ive portfolio of work on delegation. The foundations for this book were laid
in 2000 with three articles theorizing the amount of discretion of the European
Commission (Franchino, 2000a,b,c). Here, Franchino stressed the balance
between the Commission’s agenda-setting powers and member states’ control
mechanisms (comitology). In another article focusing on delegation to the
Commission, Franchino (2002) showed that there is no association between
the degree of constraint of the Commission and the two alternative logics of
delegation: credibility and efficiency (Majone, 2001). Besides delegation to the
Commission, Franchino also sought to explain delegation to national admin-
istrations. In his 2001 article he analysed the patterns of constraint that
domestic agents are subjected to when they are in charge of implementing
EU legislation (Franchino, 2001). In 2004, Franchino combined the national
and supranational implementation paths, seeking to explain the choice of
either of the two (Franchino, 2004). In his 2005 article in the Journal of
Theoretical Politics, Franchino formalized and modelled these patterns of del-
egation (Franchino, 2005). These two articles paved the way for The Powers of
the Union, in which he empirically researches this unified model, which also
includes the role of the European Parliament (EP).
Franchino seeks to find out under which conditions member states
delegate implementation powers to bureaucratic agents – the European
Commission or national authorities. This question is highly relevant from 
an academic perspective, given the ongoing debate about the optimal and
actual balance of power between the member states and supranational insti-
tutions. It is a fascinating question why ministers adopt laws that constrain
national governments and administrations, especially from a liberal inter-
governmentalist perspective. In addition, this question is normatively
relevant because it ties in to public concerns about the powers of the European
Commission vis-à-vis the member states. The risks of delegation may be
higher in the EU than in national systems, given that the European
Commission is less democratically accountable than national bureaucracies.
The added value of Franchino’s work primarily lies in the fact that he
focuses not on treaty delegation (Pollack, 1997; Moravcsik, 1998) but on
executive delegation, i.e. the granting of executive powers to bureaucratic
agents on the basis of secondary legislation. He hence seeks to model the
‘day-to-day operation of a supranational political system’ (Franchino, 2007:
2). In order to do so, Franchino draws upon two literatures. First, he uses
existing principal–agent frameworks suited to the American context, notably
Epstein and O’Halloran (1994, 1999) on the delegation of powers in the context
of the federal system of the United States. This approach is rooted in the 
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transaction costs model of delegation, and has been translated to parlia-
mentary systems by Huber and Shipan (2002). In a nutshell, this perspective
assumes an informational asymmetry between legislators and executive
authorities. The legislative agent has less information on the consequences of
a proposed policy than a bureaucratic agent in charge of implementation. The
bureaucratic agents may exploit their information advantage by shifting the
policy towards their preferred position. Legislators can prevent such bureau-
cratic drift by decreasing the agent’s discretionary powers. Limiting dis-
cretion, however, incurs other costs on the legislator, which ‘neither has the
time nor expertise to micromanage policy decisions’ (Epstein and O’Halloran,
1994: 701). In addition, the less discretion is left to an implementing agency,
the less flexibility it has to adapt the rules to changing circumstances. Studies
of delegation seek to explain the outcome of this dilemma by modelling the
level of discretion set by the legislator.
Franchino adapts this transactional cost model to the EU. He adds to the
existing literature on delegation in the EU by including EU-specific insti-
tutional variables, such as the decision rules and the choice between the
Commission and national administrations as agents. Rather than studying
only delegation to the European Commission, he explicitly considers the
possibility of delegation to the member states. Moreover, Franchino enters
conflict within and between the EU’s legislative actors into the equation.
Hence, he builds a bridge between legislative–bureaucratic theory and the
formal work on EU legislative processes (especially Steunenberg, 1994;
Garrett, 1995; Crombez, 1996).
For the reader who is not familiar with Franchino’s earlier work, the
exact object of his research is perhaps not as clear as it could be. In the intro-
duction, Franchino states that he seeks to explain centralization and bureau-
cratization in the EU. Bureaucratization is a rather straightforward concept,
which refers to the degree of discretion allowed by a piece of secondary legis-
lation. Centralization, on the other hand, is a bit harder to grasp. Whereas
on page 3 Franchino states that this concept refers to the ‘extensive reliance
for policy implementation on the European Commission’, on page 4 he uses
another definition, namely ‘the relative reliance on national administrations
and on the Commission’. Later on, the picture becomes even more compli-
cated, as Franchino explains there are actually five dependent variables,
namely delegation to the European Commission, delegation to the national
authorities, the degree of discretion for the European Commission, the
degree of discretion for the national authorities, and the relative discretion
of the national authorities vis-à-vis the European Commission.
Fortunately, transparency enters the equation with the introduction of 
the formal model (Franchino, 2007: 29). The structure of the model is the
following: the players are the Council of Ministers, composed by national
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governments, the European Commission and the European Parliament, if
involved. Besides the standard assumptions common to the literature on
delegation,1 the model is built upon the premise that national authorities
share the same preferences as the ministers who negotiate in the Council. The
model consists of three main stages. First, at the legislative stage, the
Commission proposes a certain policy to the Council of Ministers. Key aspects
of the proposal are the baseline policy, which can be visualized as a point on
a one-dimensional policy space, a degree of discretion and an implemen-
tation path, referring to the choice between the European Commission and
the national authorities. Second, the Council sets the policy, on the basis of
either unanimity or qualified majority voting (QMV), and possibly with the
involvement of the European Parliament. After the policy has been decided,
the third stage begins: that of implementation. In this stage the agent
implements the policy, based on its cost considerations and staying within
the discretionary limits. If agents exceed the limits set on discretion, they may
be challenged by the European Court of Justice, which makes such defection
an unattractive option.
From his model, Franchino (1997: 53) derives several propositions, which
he translates into the following hypotheses (pp. 64–5). To begin with, he
argues that delegation to national authorities is more likely under unanimity
than under QMV. The inverse holds for delegation to the European
Commission, which is more likely under QMV. The explanation is that under
QMV a supranational Commission has more chances of gaining the required
majority for its position. Furthermore, he expects that the discretion of
national administrations increases under unanimity and in areas with great
complexity. In addition, in the case of QMV and a supranational Commission,
the level of national discretion decreases with increasing conflict. The expla-
nation is that, the more conflict in the Council, the higher the chances of imple-
mentation problems, which gives the member states supporting a certain
proposal an incentive to shift executive powers from the national level to the
European Commission.
The level of discretion for the Commission, to continue, is expected to
be higher under QMV than under unanimity if there is less conflict between
the Commission and the pivotal Council member, and in issue areas that are
less complex. Under these conditions the legislator has fewer incentives or
possibilities to curtail the discretion of the Commission. Under QMV, in
addition, the level of discretion of the European Commission increases with
increasing conflict among the Council members. Diverging preferences in the
Council increase the fear of agency loss, a result that a majority of member
states want to prevent.
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Another set of hypotheses expands the expectations for discretion given
above to the discretion for member states relative to the Commission. This
relative discretion is thought to decrease with QMV versus unanimity and
increasing conflict within the Council, at least when QMV is being used and
the Commission has supranational preferences.
Finally, Franchino seeks to explain the preferences of Parliament versus
those of the Council regarding discretion. He expects that the EP prefers less
discretion for national administrations than the Council, because it has fewer
non-statutory control mechanisms to supervise national implementation of
EU policies. As conflict with the Council increases, the EP prefers less national
discretion than the Council. Moreover, the EP is expected to demand more
discretion for the Commission than desired by the Council.
Theoretical contribution
Franchino’s main theoretical contribution to the study of the EU is that he
tailors Epstein and O’Halloran’s transaction cost model (1999) to the complex
decision-making process of the European Union. Thus, he does not regard
the EU as a sui generis institution, but instead uses existing toolboxes from
comparative politics. This strategy is not entirely unproblematic, because
delegation in the EU differs in three important aspects from delegation in
domestic systems. In our view, these vital differences complicate the appli-
cation of the existing transaction cost approach.
A first complexity is that the EU has two possible bureaucratic agents:
national authorities and the European Commission. As is depicted in
Figure 1, Franchino (2007: 29) models the choice faced by the legislative
between these two agents. In doing so, however, he forgoes the theoretically
prior decision of whether or not to delegate, which is at the heart of the work
by Epstein and O’Halloran (1999: 56; see Figure 2). In their model, there is
a close logical connection between delegation and discretion, in that
delegating no authority comes down to granting no discretion. Their key
variable, consequently, is the amount of discretion. Franchino, by contrast,
treats delegation and discretion as analytically distinct variables. Decision-
makers first choose an implementation path (delegation), after which they
set the amount of discretion. We wonder to what extent we can speak of
delegation when the decision-maker assigns no discretion at all. Despite this
different focus, Franchino defines delegation in line with Epstein and
O’Halloran, namely as ‘the granting of substantive policy discretion’
(Franchino, 2007: 84). His work hence seems to be slightly inconsistent here:
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on the one hand he establishes a close relationship between delegation and
discretion, while he logically separates the two in both his conceptual model
and his empirical analysis. The relationship between the two concepts and
the use of delegation as a standalone dependent variable are issues that in
our view deserve further attention.
A second complexity is that the EU experiences a less stringent division
between principals and agents than most national settings. In Epstein and
O’Halloran’s account, the legislative is the principal and a bureaucratic
agency is in charge of implementation. In the European setting, by contrast,
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the ministers are in charge of both decision-making and implementation.
National ministers are agents and principals at the same time, delegating
powers to themselves as well as to their counterparts in other member states.
Consequently, there is a tension in Franchino’s work. On the one hand,
Franchino (2007: 28) views the national authorities as independent agents
who are better informed than the EU legislators at the executive stage. At the
same time, he assumes that the members of the Council of Ministers and their
bureaucracies have the same preferences (Franchino 2007: 26). These two
assumptions are mutually inconsistent. We hence agree with Thomson and
Torenvlied (2007: 8) that the principal–agent approach might be inappropri-
ate for analysing delegation to the member states.
Third, we find that the assumption of shared preferences between
governments and bureaucracies cannot be upheld empirically. Different
domestic bureaucratic actors, such as departmental units, the cabinet and the
responsible minister, may hold diverging preferences as to how a directive
should be implemented. This conceptualization clashes with that of
Franchino, as this would imply that the positions assumed by the ministers
in the Council are not a valid indicator of future implementation perform-
ance. It would be interesting to relax this assumption and consider national
ministers and their governments as different players, just as Steunenberg
(2006) has done for national implementation. This would imply that there
might be a difference in the preferences voiced in the Council, the Committee
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Council committees (see
Häge, 2007). A suggestion for future research would be to take this possibility
into account, for instance by distinguishing between A-issues and B-issues in
Council decision-making.
The fourth interesting theoretical issue arises from the empirical analysis
and concerns the link between implementation and delegation. In his
empirical chapter, Franchino (2007: 236) finds that problems with national
implementation may lead legislators to adopt stricter limits on member states’
delegation and to strengthen the executive role of the European Commission.
In our view, there is a tension between this result and Franchino’s model. As
Franchino explains on page 204, the conflict in the Council of Ministers is not
always indicative of future implementation patterns. Yet the model does not
take into account the possibility that member states do not voice their actual
policy preferences and defect during the implementation stage. In reality,
member states have an incentive not to resist a Commission proposal openly,
being aware that conflict might lead to more discretion for the Commission.
In addition, preferences aired during decision-making may be inconsequen-
tial when a future government with different preferences is responsible for
implementation. All in all, the level of intra-Council conflict may not be a
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good predictor of the degree of discretion granted, which could explain why
the results for the conflict variable are not robust. We could try to overcome
this problem by paying more attention to the measurement of preferences and
controlling for changes in government.
Finally, we would like to suggest some alternative explanations of the
degree of discretion. Franchino (2007: 7) mentions some of them: the need to
rely on technical expertise, the wish to reduce workload and to enhance the
efficiency of decision-making, as well as the wish to secure credibility. Some
of these explanations are highly relevant for the EU. Considering its relatively
small administrative staff, the Commission may not constitute a serious
option for the delegation of too many legislative acts. In the case of looming
saturation, the Commission may find itself stuck between a rock and a hard
place and gear its proposals towards delegation to member states. Hence the
assumption that the Commission’s ‘ideal choice is delegation to itself with
maximal discretion’ (Franchino, 2007: 34) may not always hold. Another
important mechanism that may be relevant to delegation in the EU is ‘blame
shifting’. By putting the responsibility for implementation in the hands of the
Commission, member states can introduce domestically unpopular policy
while maintaining that ‘the Commission made them do it’ (Smith, 1997). It
would be interesting to test Franchino’s model against such alternative expla-
nations. A first step in this direction was recently taken by Thomson and
Torenvlied (2007), who contrasted Franchino’s predictions with the commit-
ment perspective (also see Franchino, 2007: 187) and the consensus-building
perspective, which holds that the granting of discretion depends not so much
on transaction cost considerations as on the wish to reach a compromise in
the Council (also see Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000).
Methodology
To test his model, Franchino employed an impressive mixed methods design,
encompassing a wide range of analysis techniques. The design consists of
three consecutive steps. First, Franchino carried out statistical analyses on the
hypotheses relating to delegation to and the degree of discretion for national
authorities and the European Commission, as well as their relative discretion.
He then proceeded with a qualitative analysis of the hypotheses relating to
conflict and decision rules. Third, he investigated the remaining hypotheses
concerning the influence of the European Parliament on decisions about
delegation and discretion, using ordinary least squares regression and content
analysis.
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Franchino developed an impressive data set for his quantitative analysis.
Counting textbook references, he listed all major EU directives and regulations
enacted from 1958 until 1993. This innovative procedure yielded a shortlist of
159 major laws, containing more than 7000 legal provisions. For the qualitative
part, he used a different unit of analysis, namely a policy area, comprising
different laws adopted over time. The policy areas selected were public
procurement, fisheries, telecommunications and non-residents’ savings
incomes. Finally, for the analysis of the role of the EP, he constructed yet
another data set containing the amendments to 414 co-decision proposals.
An important methodological contribution made by Franchino (but see
also Franchino, 2001) is his EU-specific measure of discretion. Building on
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), Franchino constructed a discretion index
consisting of two elements. These are a delegation ratio, or the proportion of
provisions in a legislative act that delegate executive powers, and a constraint
ratio, which refers to the number of constraints divided by the number of
possible constraints. Franchino’s innovation is not so much in the construc-
tion of this index as in the classification of possible constraints on executive
action. Franchino describes 12 different statutory constraints that curtail
implementation powers, ranging from time limits to comitology.
However advanced, Franchino’s method could be improved in the
following respects. First, Franchino argues that detailed rules are a proxy for
complexity (2007: 145). In our view, however, detailed rules could be an
indicator, rather than a cause, of limited discretion. Following Epstein and
O’Halloran (1994, 1999), limiting discretion is the way to prevent bureaucratic
drift. The legislator can achieve this by developing detailed rules. For this
reason, the argument seems to be tautological. The same holds for
committees, another proxy for complexity (see Franchino 2007: 146). One
could argue that the use of committees is yet another check on executive
powers, and thus a cause of increased discretion to national authorities, rather
than an indicator of complexity. It would be interesting to use other measures
of complexity, such as the number of recitals in a piece of law (Kaeding, 2006).
Having built a data set that covers decades of EU legislative decision-
making, Franchino faced the problem that there were no data available on
Council members’ preferences over this period. To solve this problem,
Franchino employed the Manifesto data set (see Budge et al., 2001; Laver,
2001), which contains policy positions extracted from party manifestos from
1945 through to 1998. Drawing upon the work of Budge et al. (2001), Franchino
convincingly derived three measures of the Council members’ preferences.
Although this is a laudable and original approach to generate preference 
data in EU studies, the use of political manifestos has two disadvantages. First,
Mastenbroek and Veen Last Words on Delegation? Examining The Powers of the Union 3 0 3
it is questionable whether the manifesto pledges are translated into a
government’s policy, especially in the case of coalition cabinets. Second, the
translation to European politics is not straightforward either. A suggestion
for further research would be to use other measures of Council member
preferences, based on more advanced content analysis techniques (Sullivan
and Selck, 2007).
In order to establish the preferences of Commissioners, Franchino uses a
similar method as for the Council: he infers their preferences from their party
affiliation or, in the case of non-partisan Commissioners, the preferences of
their home government at the time of their appointment. This method rests
on a rather contentious assumption, namely that Commissioners share their
home government’s preferences. This is an interesting assumption because it
conflicts with the view that the Commission should act as a pro-integrationist
actor. Yet König (2005) showed that the member states are indeed aware of
the country-biased preferences of the Commissioners. He argues that member
states have established a committee system that scrutinizes the Commission’s
proposals in order to control for the influence of particular member states in
Commission proposals. Recently, Wonka (2007: 185) confirmed that Com-
missioners are being chosen because of party affiliation. More research on this
issue would be welcome.
Finally, we would like to reflect on Franchino’s mixed methods design.
On the one hand, we applaud Franchino’s intention to complement the
statistical findings with qualitative results. Qualitative methods can serve as
a powerful complement to quantitative analysis, bolstering the statistical
evidence found using process-tracing and identifying possibly omitted vari-
ables (George and Bennett, 2005; Lieberman, 2005). However, we find that
Franchino is a bit ambiguous on the exact goals of the qualitative analysis.
Listing various goals of mixed methods, such as process-tracing, the case
studies seem primarily geared towards the purpose of charting and explain-
ing developments in delegation and discretion over time. More specifically,
the case studies seem to address a theme that is different from that of the
statistical analysis, which is how distributive losses resulting from implemen-
tation problems may lead to more executive power for the Commission 
and less discretion for the member states. The focus thus shifts from an
explanation of how executive powers are designed to how they are amended
over time.
Whereas Franchino offers an interesting account of how delegation
patterns change over time in the four policy areas studied, he does not 
live up entirely to his promise to unveil the causal mechanisms under-
lying the statistical results. Instead of process-tracing, he often merely
interprets the patterns found, using his model. For instance, in the case of
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telecommunications, Franchino (2007: 226) finds that there is no clear trend
towards more or less discretion over time. He argues that this must be related
to low to moderate conflict in the Council. When he finds that much litera-
ture finds the opposite, he argues that this divergence ‘is probably over-
played’ (ibid: 227), citing two authors who support this view. In our view,
Franchino could have linked the case studies more closely to the quantitative
analysis, through process-tracing as recommended by George and Bennett
(2005), and the identification of omitted variables, through a careful compari-
son of cases that were well predicted by the model and cases that were ‘off
the line’ (Lieberman, 2005).
In addition, the overall research design is a bit imbalanced. Whereas
Franchino carefully justifies his quantitative design, he pays relatively little
attention to his qualitative design. For instance, the basis of case selection is
not entirely clear. Franchino (2007: 200) states that the selected cases are
‘archetypal examples of the situations EU legislators encounter when they
decide to delegate executive powers’. Using the variables decision rule, the
severity of intra-Council conflict and Commission preferences, he selected
four cases, without making clear why these are archetypal. Equally confus-
ing is the fact that, in this stage, the units of analysis are policy areas rather
than individual legislative acts. Franchino (2007: 200) argues that this is
important so as to keep ‘legal, political and public policy attributes’ constant.
Yet he does not clearly list these attributes, nor does he discuss the possibility
that these attributes change over time. In sum, we feel that Franchino could
have bolstered his findings by better justifying his design.
Empirical contribution
Franchino’s key empirical achievement is that he investigates the effects of
both conflict and decision rules on delegation decisions. Franchino shows
that delegation to the Commission is more likely under QMV than under
unanimity. By contrast, delegation to the member states is more likely 
under unanimity. Also, unanimity leads to greater national discretion than
does QMV, and to less discretion for the Commission. Under QMV, more
policy-related conflict leads to greater discretion for the Commission, in both
relative and absolute terms. Results for the other measures of intra-Council
conflict, referring to the integration and left–right dimensions, are less
straightforward. Regarding policy complexity, Franchino finds that member
states are given more discretion in highly complex policy areas, and the
discretion of the Commission generally increases when implementation
requires general and managerial skills. Findings for the effect of conflict
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between the Council and the Commission are not robust. An increasing
distance between the Commission’s policy position and that of the Council
pivot does not have a clear effect on the discretion given to the European
Commission. These results are broadly supported by the case studies. Finally,
concerning the role of the EP, Franchino’s main conclusion is that delegation
to and discretion of the Commission increase when the EP plays a role,
especially when there is conflict between the EP and the Council.
Furthermore, Franchino also pays explicit attention to his descriptive
findings. Most importantly, he finds that EU legislators rely twice as often
on national administrations as on the European Commission for implemen-
tation. Moreover, for about 13% of all cases Franchino found no delegation
to the national administrations, and the Commission was excluded from the
implementation of every second law (55%). In nearly 60% of the cases the
legislative chose a singular implementation path. Regarding the policy fields,
delegation to national authorities is most common in legislation concerning
the movement of persons, taxation and company law. Low national del-
egation rates are found in measures relating to competition law, customs law
and agriculture. Yet in our view we should treat these figures with caution,
given that the delegation ratio by itself is a rather ambiguous measure if it
has not been corrected for the number of constraints. A legislator may grant
extensive powers to an agent while counteracting this with extensive
constraints, which results in zero discretionary powers. It is not entirely clear
to what extent the delegation ratio is a useful standalone indicator. At the
same time, this part of the discretion measure has been implemented as such
in recent research, even serving as a measure of discretion (Thomson et al.,
2007: 694).
Concerning discretion, the European Commission is confronted with
twice as many statutory constraints as are national authorities. In line with our
previous remarks, it is interesting to note that, the more executive powers are
delegated, the more constraints are imposed on the agents, thus lowering
discretion. Discretion, which Epstein and O’Halloran (1999: 90) defined as a
dichotomous variable from 0 (no delegation) to 1 (full delegation), ranges from
0 to 0.49 for national administrations, with the mean at 0.16. Commission
discretion ranges from 0 to 0.34, with the mean at 0.04. Furthermore, Franchino
finds that the average number of provisions has declined steadily over time,
identifying a tendency in the EU towards laws with fewer provisions. An
opposite trend is reported for the amount of discretion, at least for the national
administrations. The data show that national discretion has increased by about
1% a year. For the Commission, no such long-term trend is identified. Here,
an increase in discretion appears to be linked to the eras of the Commission’s
presidents: under Hallstein and Delors, the Commission acquired relatively
many delegated powers.
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Franchino’s results indicate that the Commission faces serious constraints
when it comes to the implementation of EU policies. Therefore, one could
argue that the Commission is not a ‘runaway bureaucracy’, escaping effec-
tive steering and control by member states, but rather a controlled agency
whose powers are being carefully limited. At the same time, Franchino has
shown that the degree of control over the Commission depends on the
Commission’s president. If a strong leader is in charge, controls can loosen,
resulting in more discretion. What is more, as we have argued, it is not clear
to what extent the delegation ratio in itself is a valid indicator of the degree
of centralization. The discretion ratio, a more valid measure, on average is
higher for the member states than for the Commission. All in all, fears of
extensive centralization seem to be misplaced; the legislators keep a very tight
check on the Commission.
These empirical results, though, have to be interpreted with caution. First,
the data set is relatively small (n = 153), especially as it comprises more than
three decades of legislation, which comes down to an average of about five
laws a year. When compared with the annual output of secondary legislation,
estimated at more than 500 in the mid-1980s (Schulz and König, 2000: 653),
this bias becomes even more apparent. Second, the data are biased towards
conflict, because they cover only the major laws of the EU (Franchino, 2007:
80). This bias reduces the external validity of the findings and challenges
Franchino’s intention to understand day-to-day decision-making in the EU.
It would be interesting to find out more about delegation patterns in more
‘technical’ EU legislation.
Conclusion
Franchino has written a rigorous account of the mechanisms underlying
delegation in the EU. Combining insights from the general transaction costs
literature with spatial models of EU decision-making, he sets the standard for
further work on EU delegation.
The empirical implications of Franchino’s work are clear and convincing.
Most importantly, he demonstrates that, the greater the conflict within the
Council, the more discretion is given to the European Commission under
QMV. By contrast, the greater the conflict within the Council, the more
restricted are the implementation powers of national bureaucracies. This latter
finding sets the EU apart from national political systems, where conflict has
been proven to increase the level of discretion for executive agents. In this
respect, the EU appears to be a sui generis phenomenon after all.
Franchino’s work offers a solid basis for further theoretical and empiri-
cal work. We envisage the following research agenda. A first avenue for future
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research would be to relax the assumption that ministers and their govern-
ments hold the same preferences. Second, more work could be done on
measuring Council preferences, for instance using more advanced content
analysis techniques or expert judgements. Third, more research could be done
that tests Franchino’s principal–agent model against competing explanations
of delegation such as commitment, blame-shifting and consensus-seeking.
Fourth, we could pay more attention to the variable of complexity, and
develop alternative measures. Fifth, it would be interesting to carry out 
more case studies that lay bare the causal mechanisms linking conflict to
delegation outcomes and identify possibly omitted variables. Such research
would greatly increase the plausibility of Franchino’s results. Finally, with
regard to Franchino’s objective of understanding day-to-day decision-
making, it would be interesting to repeat his analysis on a data set not only
containing major EU laws but extending to the more technical measures that
the EU enacts on a daily basis.
A final set of questions that require more attention concerns the norma-
tive implications of EU delegation. Franchino rightly argues that delegation
studies are important from a normative point; the general ‘uneasiness’ about
centralization processes is even more relevant for the EU than for national
states, given the alleged democratic deficit of the EU. We agree with Franchino
that such questions cannot be answered on the basis of empirical research.
The judgement of whether the EU is too centralized should be a political one.
But the rich empirical information provided by Franchino offers a first step
towards answering this question: member states are more at ease delegating
powers to national bureaucracies than to the supranational European
Commission, unless they have reason to distrust the intentions of their
colleagues in the Council.
Notes
1 More technical assumptions are that the policy space is one-dimensional and
that preference points are single-peaked. The players’ utility is assumed to
have a quadratic functional form. Legislators act under uncertainty;
implementing agents have an information advantage over legislators.
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